

Message Text

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00511 01 OF 02 131601Z

47

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USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0511

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: STRULAK DECEMBER 12

1974 PRESS CONFERENCE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

SUMMARY: DURING Q'S AND A'S AFTER STRULAK PRESS CONFERENCE, STRULAK SAID THAT NO REAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN NEGOTIATIONS SO FAR BUT THAT THE POSITIVE ATTITUDES AND THE PROCEDURES WHICH HAD BEEN DEVELOPED SHOULD ALSO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. STRULAK REFUSED IN RESPONSE TO A SPECIFIC QUESTION TO MAKE ANY MENTION OF EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL. WHEN ASKED WHETHER ALLEGED SCHLESINGER REFERENCE THAT FBSS MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE DISCUSSED IN VIENNA, STRULAK POINTED OUT THAT WEST HAS NOT SO FAR SHOWN READINESS TO INCLUDE AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE REDUCTIONS, WHEREAS EAST HAD ASKED THAT SUCH WEAPONS

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00511 01 OF 02 131601Z

BE REDUCED. HOWEVER, HE REFUSED COMMENT TO THE FOLLOW-UP

QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER, IF FBS'S ARE DISCUSSED IN VIENNA, EAST MIGHT BE WILLING TO OFFER SOMETHING IN RETURN. STRULAK ALSO REJECTED QUESTION ATTEMPTING TO LINK VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT ON COMMON CEILING FOR UNCLEAR MISSILES WITH WESTERN VIENNA PROPOSAL FOR COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCES. HE ADHERED TO STANDARD POSITION THAT WESTERN POSITION ON COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCES MANPOWER HAS BEEN TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT FROM THE OVERALL MILITARY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY CHALLENGE THE IDEA OF A COMMON CEILING AS SUCH. TEXT OF Q'S AND A'S FOLLOW. END OF SUMMARY

BEGIN TEXT OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

STRULAK DECEMBER 12, 1974 PRESS CONFERENCE, Q'S AND A'S

1. Q. (LENDVAI, FINANCIAL TIMES) THERE SEEMS TO BE A SENSATIONAL CHANGE CONCERNING WHAT YOU READ IN YOUR PAPER, WITH RESPECT TO THE WESTERN SIDE. BECAUSE ON PAGE 2 YOU SAY THAT THE WARSAW PACT FORCES ARE INTERESTED IN REDUCTIONS BY ALL 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS; LATER, YOU SPEAK ABOUT THE FOUR SOCIALIST STATES AND THE SIX WESTERN STATES, OMITTING THE U.S. NOW DOES THIS MEAN YOU HAVE A SPECIAL APPROACH TO THE U.S., OR IS IT JUST A TECHNICAL MATTER?

A. WELL, I FIGURED OUT THAT THERE WERE 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, BECAUSE THIS IS OUR POSITION. THESE ARE ALL THE POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN THE FUTURE AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS. AND SO OUR PROGRAM AND OUR APPROACH IS THAT ALL SHOULD ACCEPT EQUAL OBLIGATIONS AND REDUCE. SO THAT IS THAT AS FAR AS THE 11 ARE CONCERNED. THERE ARE FOUR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WHO HAVE THE STATUS OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, OUT OF THE SEVEN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WHO ARE TAKING PART IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY WILL TAKE PART IN THE REDUCTIONS, AND THEY HAVE DECLARED THEIR READINESS TO DO SO IN AGREEMENT WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE PREPARATORY NEGOTIATIONS ON THE STATUS OF THE PARTICIPANTS. NOW ABOUT THE SIX: I HAVE BEEN MENTIONING THE SIX IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROBLEM WHICH WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING FOR SOME TIME NOW, THE PROBLEM OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FIRST. AND ALSO, THIS BELONGS TO THE PROBLEM OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. OUT OF THE SEVEN - UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00511 01 OF 02 131601Z

I ALREADY SAID THERE ARE FOUR ON THE SOCIALIST SIDE-THOSE SEVEN ARE ON THE WESTERN SIDE. OUT OF THESE SEVEN, ONLY ONE, THAT IS THE U.S., HAS SUGGESTED IN CONCRETE TERMS TO REDUCE ITS FORCES. THE SIX OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE SO FAR REFUSED TO DO THAT, AND THAT IS WHY I MENTIONED THE SIX. AND I SAID THAT THIS ATTITUDE OF THE SIX WESTERN COUNTRIES IS AT PRESENT IN OUR VIEW THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO MAKING

PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

2. Q. (GOSHKO, WASHINGTON POST) WOULD YOU SAY THAT A FAIR SUMMARY OF YOUR STATEMENT IS THAT IN 13 MONTHS NOW OF ON-AND -OFF NEGOTIATIONS, THAT REALLY NO PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE?

A. I WOULD SAY THAT THIS IS A CORRECT STATEMENT, NO PROGRESS HAS BEEN REACHED SO FAR IN THE SENSE OF ANY AGREED AGREEMENT. NOW, THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY TO MEASURE THAT IN OTHER TERMS, IN TERMS OF KNOWING EACH OTHER'S POSITION, IN MATTERS OF SEEING THE POSSIBILITIES, IN BETTER APPRECIATING THE VALUES OF OUR OWN PROPOSALS, AND THE ABILITY TO TALK ABOUT THESE THINGS; THESE ARE PROBABLY NOT SIGNS OF PROGRESS, BUT THIS SHOULD CERTAINLY ALSO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

3. Q. (ALTSCHUL, AUSTRIAN PRESS AGENCY) COULD YOU CONFIRM, MR. AMBASSADOR, THAT IN THE MEETING DURING THE PAST WEEK, THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN ADDITIONAL PROPOSAL BY THE EASTERN SIDE?

A. I WOULD REFER YOU TO WHAT I HAVE SAID IN MY STATEMENT. THOSE ARE THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES PRESENTED DURING THIS ROUND WITH A VIEW TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD AND ACHIEVE AGREEMENT. YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT I WILL STAND ON THIS FORMULATION.

4. Q. (NORWEGIAN NEWSPAPERS) DO YOU THINK THAT THERE WILL BE MUCH LONGER RECESS THAN USUAL THIS TIME? COULD YOU SAY SOMETHING ABOUT THIS?

A. WELL, YOU KNOW THE RHYTHM OF THE WORK IS, SO TO SAY, DETERMINED BY THE PARTICIPANTS THEMSELVES. IT IS A FUNCTION OF THEIR NEEDS, SO UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 04 MBFR V 00511 01 OF 02 131601Z

TO SAY, THEIR MUTUAL NEEDS. I WOULD NOT SAY THAT THE RECESS NOW IS A CONSIDERABLY LONGER ONE THAN USUAL. IT IS AS LONG AS IT IS NEEDED TO BE. YOU ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT RECESS IS NOT DEVOTED TO REST EXCLUSIVELY.

5. KPOSSANER, PRESSE) MR. AMBASSADOR, COULD YOU COMMENT ON THIS PASSAGE IN YOUR STATEMENT WHERE YOU SAID THAT THERE WERE NO REDUCTIONS, NO CONTEMPLATION ON THE WESTERN SIDE FOR REDUCTION OF EITHER AIR FORCES OR NUCLEAR FORCES IN THIS AREA. NOW WE LEARNED OF A RECENT PRESS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY SCHLESINGER IN BRUSSELS, WHERE HE SAID THERE MIGHT BE - IF THERE ARE- THERE MIGHT BE NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS THE AMERICANS HAVE IN EUROPE, THERE MIGHT BE NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN MBFR. NOW COULD YOU COMMENT, COULD YOU ELA-

BORATE ON THIS, FROM YOUR POINT OF VIEW? AT THIS POINT, WHAT COULD YOU OFFER THE WESTERN SIDE AS AN EQUIVALENT IF THEY PREFER TO SPEAK HERE ABOUT NUCLEAR FORCES IN WESTERN EUROPE?

A. WELL, I WOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS: FIRST, I AM DISCUSSING THE POSITION OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AND ON THE BASIS OF WHAT WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING IN VIENNA. THAT MEANS ON THE BASIS OF THE PROPOSALS THAT HAVE BY NOW BEEN MADE PUBLIC. AND ON THIS BASIS I AM ENTIRELY CORRECT WHEN I SAY THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO WESTERN READINESS TO INCLUDE AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE REDUCTIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, YOU KNOW VERY WELL THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, AND POLAND IN PARTICULAR, ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE DANGER OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND ALSO THE PURPOSE OF THESE WEAPONS IN THE OVERALL CAPABILITY IN THE AREA. AND WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY WITH THE AGREED SUBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH IS MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, WE HAVE BEEN ASKING FOR COVERAGE BY THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT OF THESE WEAPONS. AND THAT IS OUR POSITION. NOW, I THINK IT IS MUCH TOO PREMATURE TO SPEAK ABOUT THINGS LIKE EQUIVALENT OR SOMETHING ELSE. AS I SAID, WE ARE STILL FACED HERE WITH THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WHICH DO NOT WISH TO REDUCE AIR FORCES OR NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00511 02 OF 02 131648Z

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UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0511

FROM US REP MBFR

6. (WIELAND, REUTERS) IN YOUR STATEMENT YOU SAID THAT FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE INITIAL AGREEMENT, YOU DEPARTED FROM YOUR ORIGINAL IDEA THAT EACH OF THE WESTERN AND SOCIALIST PARTICIPANTS SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCTIONS PRO-PORTIONATELY CONCERNING NUMERICAL STRENGTH. IF YOU DEPARTED FROM THIS PRINCIPLE, WHAT DID YOU SUBSTITUTE FOR IT. WHAT IS YOUR PHILOSOPHY; YOU SET OUT YOUR PHILOSOPHY HERE? WHAT REPLACES THIS?

A. WELL, I SAID WE ARE READY IN RESPONSE TO WESTERN WISHES TO DEMONSTRATE FLEXIBILITY ON THIS PARTICULAR SUBJECT, IN LINE WITH THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP, IN RESPONSE TO THE WISHES OF THE WESTERN SIDE. THE PROPORTIONS, THE DISTRIBUTIONS OF QUOTAS, WOULD BE TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION WESTERN WISHES. (Q. BUT SURELY, YOU HAVE ACCEPTED THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN POWERS ON THE FIRST REDUCTION TO BE STARTED BY THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION. WHAT PATTERN DO YOU ENVISAGE IN THE UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00511 02 OF 02 131648Z

REST OF 1975 IN REDUCTIONS BY THE REMAINING NINE PARTICIPANTS?) WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY PATTERN? (HOW DO ENVISAGE TO ATTAIN YOUR TOTAL OF 40,000? ON WHAT BASIS ARE THESE REDUCTIONS TO BE ACHIEVED?) WELL, YOU ARE GOING TO MUCH INTO DETAILS. I SAID I WOULD NOT WANT TO SPEAK ABOUT DETAILS. HOWEVER, IT IS CORRECT, AS YOU SAID, THAT THE MAJOR PORTION WILL BE TAKEN BY THE TWO POWERS, AND AS FAR AS THE REST IS CONCERNED, WE HAVE INDICATED CERTAIN IDEAS, BUT WE HAVE ALSO INDICATED THAT WE ARE FLEXIBLE, AND WE CAN DISCUSS IT TOGETHER WITH OUR WESTERN PARTNERS. (WOULD IT BE CORRECT TO SAY THAT YOUR THINKING ENVISAGES THAT AMONG THE REDUCTIONS ON THE WESTERN SIDE, A PREPONDERANT ROLE SHOULD BE PLAYED BY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY?) WELL, THAT WOULD BE CONTRADICTORY TO WHAT YOU SAID FIRST, ABOUT THE MAJOR SHARE-(WILL, I MEAN OF THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THE WESTERN SIDE.) WELL, WE ARE GETTING TOO MUCH INTO DETAILS HERE. I THINK WHAT I SAID IS CLEAR ENOUGH. I DESCRIBED THIS CHANGE OF CONDITIONS AS A DEMONSTRATION OF GOOD WILL, AND NOT IN ORDER TO APPLY DISCRIMINATORY CRITERIA TO ANY OF THE PARTICIPANTS.

7. Q. (ERTL, KURIER) YOU SAID YOU ARE STILL HOPING FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE OF YOUR WESTERN PARTNERS, WOULD YOU SAY THAT THE END OF THAT PERIOD WOULD BE THE CONCLUSION OF THE CSCE WITH A SUMMIT?

A. IT WOULD BE MUCH TOO ARTIFICIAL AN IDEA. I DON'T THINK ANY OF US HERE, REALIZING THE CHARACTER OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, PUTS

ANY CONCLUSIVE DATES. I WOULD NOT LIKE TO FORMULATE IT IN THIS WAY.

Q. (MITCHELMORE, NEW YORK TIMES) MR. AMBASSADOR, WE HAVE HEARD IT SAID THAT SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE OTHER NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST CAN AFFECT THE ATMOSPHERE HERE. SINCE WE LAST TALKED WITH YOU, THERE HAS BEEN AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE IN VLADIVOSTOK ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS, AND THERE HAVE BEEN MINOR AGREEMENTS IN GENEVA. HOW HAS THIS AFFECTED THE ATMOSPHERE HERE?

A. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE ATMOSPHERE HERE HAD AT ALL TIMES CONSIDERED BY ALL THE PARTICIPANTS TO BE GOOD, BETTER THAN GOOD - VERY GOOD, SUCH EVENTS AS VLADIVOSTOK OR THE PROGRESS IN GENEVA CAN ONLY SERVE OF COURSE TO MAKE IT EVEN BETTER. THIS IS THE CORRECT APPRECIATION. (Q. HAVE THESE EVENTS SERVED
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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00511 02 OF 02 131648Z

TO MAKE IT BETTER?) YOU MIGHT SAY THAT ALL THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT DEAL WITH DETENTE ARE MUTUALLY INFLUENCED IN THE SENSE THAT POSITIVE RESULTS HELP THE OTHER TYPES OF NEGOTIATIONS. THEY ALL AIM AT DETENTE AND STRENGTHENING IT, MAKING DETENTE IRREVERSIBLE. THIS IS A MULTIFACETED PROCESS, AND EVERY PART WOULD STRENGTHEN THE OTHERS THROUGH POSITIVE RESULTS, PHILOSOPHICALLY SPEAKING, OF COURSE.

9. Q. (KURIER) YOU SPOKE ABOUT PRINCIPAL OBSTACLES. WOULD YOU SAY THAT THERE IS NO READINESS AT ALL ON THE WESTERN SIDE TO COMPROMISE?

A. WELL, I THINK I HAVE GIVEN THE EVALUATION OF THE WESTERN POSITION IN MY STATEMENT. IF YOU MAKE AN EQUATION, YOU WOULD SAY THAT SOME PARTICIPANTS HAVE SHOWN A SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE, AND IF THE OTHERS SHOW THE SAME SPIRIT, YOU GET COMPROMISE. NOW IF ONE OF THESE ELEMENTS IS LACKING, OF COURSE THERE CAN BE NO COMPROMISE.

10. Q. (CLARKE BBC) IN THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT BETWEEN MR. FORD AND MR. BREZHNEV, IT SEEMS THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF A COMMON CEILING WAS ACCEPTED REGARDING NUCLEAR MISSILES. YET THE PRINCIPLE OF A COMMON CILING REGARDING GROUND FORCES IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS HERE IN VIENNA HAS NOT BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE WARSAW PACT. IS THERE ANY POSSIBILITY THAT THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE WILL CAUSE SOME RETHINKING ON THE PART OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WITH REGARD TO THE WESTERN PROPOSALS HERE IN VIENNA?

A. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR WHY WE DO NOT APPROVE OF THE IDEA OF A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCES, AND I DON'T THINK THERE IS A CONNECTION BETWEEN VLADIVOSTOK AND THIS THINK. ONLY TODAY DID I SAY IN MY STATEMENT THAT THE IDEA OF A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCES

MANPOWER IS ABSTRACTED FROM THE WHOLE PICTURE OF THE MILITARY
SITUATION IN THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE. IT DOES NOT TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT
THE OTHER ELEMENTS, THE OTHER ASPECT OF MILITARY CAPABILITY. IT
IS VERY DIFFICULT TO ISOLATE THE ISSUE LIKE THAT AND TRY TO DEAL
WITH A COMMON CEILING LIMITED TO GROUND FORCES. IT IS, IN
FACT, IMPOSSIBLE. RESOR

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